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MAKING THE BEST EVEN BETTER:
MODIFYING PAWL AND TIMPE’S SOLUTION TO
THE PROBLEM OF HEAVENLY FREEDOM
Christopher M. Brown

In a recent paper, “Incompatiblism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” Timothy
Pawl and Kevin Timpe discuss and propose a novel solution to a problem
posed for traditional Christian theism that they call the Problem of Heavenly
Freedom. In short, Christian tradition contains what seems to be a contradiction, namely, the redeemed in heaven are free but nonetheless can’t sin. Pawl
and Timpe’s solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is particularly attractive for two reasons: it shows great respect for the Christian tradition’s
teaching on heaven, and it entails that the redeemed in heaven act with morally weighty libertarian free will. Nonetheless, I think their solution can be
improved upon. By drawing on some of the teachings of the Catholic tradition on heaven, particularly those of St. Thomas Aquinas, I raise three
objections to Pawl and Timpe’s solution and introduce a modified version of
their solution. In doing so, I have attempted to make their “best” solution to
the Problem of Heavenly Freedom even better.

In a recent paper,1 Timothy Pawl and Kevin Timpe discuss a problem
posed for traditional Christian theism that they call the Problem of Heavenly
Freedom. Traditional Christian theism includes the following two claims:
(i) The redeemed in heaven have free will.2
(ii) The redeemed in heaven are no longer capable of sinning.3
On the face of it, (i) and (ii) appear to be logically inconsistent. For if the
redeemed in heaven do not have the ability to do evil, then, we might
wonder whether they really possess free will. But if the redeemed in
heaven are really free, then surely they can choose to do evil. Traditional
Christian theism—at least where its account of heaven is concerned—
therefore appears to be incoherent.
“Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009), 398–419.
See, e.g., St. Augustine of Hippo, Admonition and Grace xxii, 33.
3
See, e.g., Aphraates the Persian Sage, Treatises xx, 12; St. Augustine of Hippo, To Orosius
Against the Priscillianists and Origenists vi, 7; St. Augustine, Enchiridion xxix, 111; St. Augustine, Admonition and Grace xxii, 33; St. Augustine, The Unfinished Work Against Julian’s Second
Reply v, 61.
1
2
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In this paper I do five things. First, I explain Pawl and Timpe’s solution
to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom. Second, I raise three objections for
Pawl and Timpe’s solution. Third, I offer an account of morally weighty
action that does not fall prey to the objections I raise for Pawl and Timpe’s
account. Fourth, I show that my solution to the Problem of Heavenly
Freedom, like Pawl and Timpe’s solution, is consistent with the free will
defense. Fifth, I show my solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom
has an additional advantage over Pawl and Timpe’s solution: it provides a
stronger explanation for why the redeemed in heaven can’t sin.
1. Pawl and Timpe’s Solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom
Taking James F. Sennett’s solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom
as a point of departure,4 Pawl and Timpe develop their own solution by
first noting “a person has the ability to form a moral character which later
precludes that person from willing certain things.”5 For example, John
develops a moral character such that he simply can’t torture a child for
a nickel when asked to do so. Pawl and Timpe think it reasonable to say
John is free in a libertarian sense with respect to his refusal to torture a
child in this situation, given that John’s moral character is partially a function of free choices he’s made in the past. They call actions that are free
merely on the basis of arising from one’s freely-formed moral character
“derivatively free” actions.6 But Pawl and Timpe think what we’ve said
about John’s case can be applied to the case of the redeemed in heaven. For
even if the actions of a redeemed person in heaven were determined by
her freely formed perfect moral character, the redeemed person’s actions
in heaven could still be derivatively free in a libertarian sense of free. This
is because the redeemed person’s willed actions would trace back to free
choices that she made during the period of her pre-heavenly existence,
where such choices were undetermined.7
But Pawl and Timpe think that the redeemed in heaven also possess
non-derivative libertarian free will. According to Christian tradition, the redeemed in heaven don’t have the ability to choose between good and evil,
given their perfected moral characters. But nothing about having a perfected moral character necessarily rules out having the ability to choose
between this good rather than that one in heaven. Indeed, according to
4
See Sennett’s “Is there Freedom in Heaven?,” Faith and Philosophy 16:1 (1999), 69–82.
Before explaining their own position, Pawl and Timpe evaluate and reject four alternative
solutions to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom: a compatibilist solution; a concessionist solution; a Molinist solution; and Sennett’s solution (see “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in
Heaven,” 398–409). For a response to Pawl and Timpe’s paper from a compatibilist perspective, see Steven B. Cowan’s “Compatibilism and the Sinlessness of the Redeemed in Heaven,”
Faith and Philosophy 28 (2011), 416–431. For Pawl and Timpe’s response to Cowan, see their
“Heavenly Freedom: A Reply to Cowan,” Faith and Philosophy 30 (2013), 188–197.
5
“Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 409.
6
Ibid., 410.
7
For the sake of this paper, I assume with Pawl and Timpe it is logically possible for an
action to be derivatively free in a libertarian sense.
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Pawl and Timpe, the redeemed in heaven can even make non-trivial, nonderivative choices. Consider a certain kind of free act that Alvin Plantinga
has labeled morally significant.8 A free action is morally significant for some
person S at time t if and only if S’s performing the action at t would be
morally wrong and it would be morally right for S to refrain from performing the action at t, or vice versa. Since, according to Pawl and Timpe,
the redeemed in heaven can’t ever choose evil, the redeemed in heaven do
not have the ability to make morally significant choices. Nonetheless, Pawl
and Timpe think the redeemed in heaven can make what they call morally relevant choices, and morally relevant choices, like morally significant
choices, have moral weight. According to Pawl and Time, a free choice is
morally relevant if and only if “the person is free to choose among at least
two options, and at least two of the options, say, A and B, are related such
that either A is better than B or B is better than A.”9 For Pawl and Timpe,
morally relevant choices include choices whether or not to perform supererogatory acts. If one chooses to perform a supererogatory act, then
one chooses something better than choosing not to perform such an act,
although choosing not to perform the supererogatory act would not count
as an evil act. Since the choice to perform a supererogatory act is morally
superior to the choice not to perform such an act, the choice to do (or
not to do) something supererogatory has moral weight. For example, say
John sells everything he owns and gives the money to the poor. Had he
not done this—let us assume for the sake of argument—John would not
necessarily have done something morally wrong.10 But John’s deciding to
follow one of the evangelical counsels is morally superior (again, given
John’s circumstances) to deciding not to do so. Hence, although John’s
choice whether or not to sell his possessions and give them to the poor is
not morally significant, it nonetheless has moral weight.
One might wonder whether the redeemed in heaven have the ability to
make morally relevant choices. Pawl and Timpe think so. They explain:
It seems to us at least possible that a person can cling to the mean [of virtue]
to such an extent that he can’t fall from it, but he could nevertheless still
cling tighter. If that is possible, then the redeemed in heaven are such that
they are perfected . . . insofar as they cling to the mean so tenaciously that
they can’t but remain there, but are nevertheless such that they could always
cling tighter. Their morally relevant choices bring them to cling ever tighter
to the mean, and we can judge them to be better for choosing supererogatory
actions insofar as such choices bring them to cling more tenaciously to the
mean. And, we should note, that if we think about clinging to the good
8
See, e.g., Plantinga’s God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 30.
Whenever I employ the expression morally significant in this paper, I have Plantinga’s technical sense of that expression in mind.
9
“Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 416. Whenever I employ the expression
morally relevant in this paper, I have Pawl and Timpe’s technical sense of that expression in
mind.
10
I am assuming (with Pawl and Timpe) that there are some actions that are morally better
than others, but are not thereby morally obligatory actions.
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rather than clinging to the mean, we can say that through the everlasting
years that the blessed spend with God, they are never-endingly coming
ever closer to Him, who is Goodness itself, ever clinging more tenaciously
to Him.11

Pawl and Timpe thus maintain that the redeemed in heaven can be free
in heaven, even though they can’t choose to do evil there, and this in a
non-trivial, non-derivative, libertarian sense of free. For the redeemed
in heaven can choose to perform supererogatory actions. In concluding
their paper, Pawl and Timpe admit that they have nowhere “provided
an argument for incompatibilism or the traditional view of heaven.” But
they maintain that “for those who are inclined to both incompatibilism
and traditional Christianity, we think our view is the best solution to the
Problem of Heavenly Freedom.”12 I now turn to raising some objections
for Pawl and Timpe’s solution.
2. Objections to Pawl and Timpe’s Solution
According to Pawl and Timpe, “the only way . . . that a non-divine person
can be free and have a moral character precluding of sin is if that person
previously freely formed her moral character into one that precludes
sin.”13 But what are we to say about the countless human persons who
die before ever reaching the age of reason? For, as Scripture teaches, “it is
appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment” (Hebrews
9:27).14 A traditional way of reading this passage is that human persons
do not do anything in the next life to bring about their eternal salvation.15
In addition, according to the Catholic Christian tradition, those persons
who are baptized and die before the age of reason are, in fact, among the

Ibid., 418.
Ibid., 419.
13
Ibid., 415.
14
I’m citing the Douay-Rheims 1899 American Edition translation here and throughout
the paper. See also the following Scripture passages: “I must work the works of him who
sent me, whilst it is day, for the night cometh when no man can work” (John 9:4); “For we
must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that everyone may receive the
proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil” (2 Cor. 5: 10;
emphasis mine; for St. Paul “of the body” is a way of speaking about this life. Cf. 2 Cor. 5:8);
“Therefore whilst we have time, let us work good to all men” (Gal 6:10a).
15
See, e.g., the Catechism of the Catholic Church [CCC] (2nd ed.), 1013 and 1021. One might
think persons in purgatory constitute an exception to what I say here. But according to one
way of understanding the Catholic conception of purgatory, this is not the case. According to
this conception, those in purgatory are no longer able to choose to do things that will make
their characters better than they were at the time of their death. Rather, a person in purgatory
necessarily—because of the charity for God in her soul at the time of death—wills to suffer
the purgation of whatever keeps her from being able to will single-mindedly the love of
God to the degree that she will do so in heaven, which degree of charity is a function of the
amount of charity in her heart at the time of her death. For presentations of this view, see,
e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae (ST) Ia. q. 62, a. 9 and Supplement, q. 71, a. 2. See
also Dom J. B. McLaughlin’s essay in The Teaching of the Catholic Church, George D. Smith, ed.
(New York: Macmillan, 1949, vol. 2), 1154–1155.
11
12
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redeemed in heaven.16 Indeed, they go to heaven without spending time
in purgatory.17
Why does any of this present a problem for Pawl and Timpe’s solution?
Consider the following plausible understanding of the nature of persons: a
person is “an individual substance of a rational nature,”18 where a rational
nature is one that confers upon its possessor (at least the root capacity for)
the powers of understanding and willing. Let us also assume that persons
in heaven are perfected persons, and perfected persons actually make use
of the powers essential to the species to which they belong. Finally, some
people die and go to heaven without ever having the chance to make morally significant choices, whether we’re talking about all children who die
before the age of reason or, at the very least, baptized children who die before that time. Therefore, my first objection to Pawl and Timpe’s solution
to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is that it is inconsistent with (what
for some, e.g., orthodox Catholics, is) the theological fact that there are
perfected persons in heaven who never had a chance to freely contribute
to the development of their own moral characters.19
16
See, e.g., Pope Benedict XII’s Apostolic Constitution Benedictus Deus (1336): “By this
Constitution which is to remain in force forever, we, with apostolic authority, define the
following: according to the general disposition of God, the souls . . . of children who have
been reborn by the . . . baptism of Christ, . . . if they die before attaining the use of free will . . .
these souls, immediately (mox) after death . . . are . . . with Christ in heaven, in the heavenly
kingdom and paradise, joined to the company of the holy angels” (J. Neuner and J. Dupuis,
eds., The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church [New York: Alba
House, 1982], 684–685). For a text with similar wording, see also the Decree for the Greeks
(1439), from the General Council of Florence, session six. Finally, see also session eight of the
General Council of Florence, which treats generally of the sacraments, and in the following
text, specifically treats of the effects of the sacrament of baptism: “The effect of this sacrament
[of baptism] is the remission of all original and actual guilt, also of all penalty that is owed for
that guilt. Hence no satisfaction for past sins is to be imposed on the baptized, but those who
die before they incur any guilt go straight (statim) to the kingdom of heaven and the vision
of God” (Norman P. Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils [London: Sheed and Ward,
1990, vol. 1], 543). I’m grateful to Timothy Pawl for pointing out this last passage to me.
17
See the passages cited in note 16, particularly the passage from session eight of the
General Council of Florence. I’m grateful to Timothy Pawl and Colin Johnson for raising
questions on this score, showing me the need to make explicit that, according to Catholic
doctrine, baptized infants who die before the age of reason do not spend time in purgatory,
but go straight (statim) to heaven.
18
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis contra Eutychen
et Nestorium, ch. 3.
19
An anonymous reviewer wonders whether it can be meaningful to talk of perfected persons who have never had a chance to contribute to the development of their own rational
capacities, as in the case of infants who die before the age of reason and go straight to heaven.
Spatial restrictions prevent me from giving this good question the kind of answer it deserves
here. Suffice it to say that it does not look impossible for God to supply miraculously in
heaven powers to a person that typically come by way of natural development. Presuming
that a child before the age of reason cannot exercise any rational capacities, it is in heaven
that she exercises such capacities for the first time. This child is nonetheless a perfected person
in heaven in a number of senses: first, she suffers in heaven from no spiritual, psychological,
or physical defect; second, and more importantly, she participates in the divine nature such
that she enjoys an unmediated intellectual and volitional union with God, which union involves infused knowledge and is not something that any created human person can naturally
possess or develop. See what follows for more discussion of the beatific vision.
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Here follows a second objection. Pawl and Timpe’s solution to the
Problem of Heavenly Freedom assumes that the redeemed in heaven have
the ability to make morally relevant choices, and in particular, supererogatory choices. Pawl and Timpe suggest the following implications of the
redeemed in heaven’s having the ability to make morally relevant choices:
(iii) If the redeemed have the ability to make morally relevant choices
in heaven, then the redeemed in heaven have the ability to undergo moral improvement in heaven.
(iv) If the redeemed in heaven have the ability to undergo moral improvement in heaven, then the redeemed in heaven have the ability to grow ever closer to God in heaven, i.e., increase their essential
beatitude20 in heaven.21
Given one’s commitment to (iii) and (iv), one should also think that
(v) If the redeemed in heaven can make morally relevant choices in
heaven, then the redeemed in heaven have the ability to grow ever
closer to God in heaven, i.e., increase their essential beatitude in
heaven [from (iii) and (iv), HS].
But there are good reasons for thinking the redeemed in heaven do not
have the ability to grow ever closer to God in heaven. I will offer three.
If any of these reasons are good ones, we will have good reason to think
either it is not the case that the redeemed in heaven can make morally relevant
choices—if (iii) and (iv) above are both true—or, if the redeemed in heaven
have the ability to make morally relevant choices, that proposition (iii) or
proposition (iv) is false.22 (As we’ll see later in the paper, if (iii) and (iv) are
true, in my view the redeemed in heaven can still make morally weighty
choices, even if they can’t make morally relevant ones.)
The first reason for thinking the redeemed in heaven can’t get ever
closer to God in heaven is as follows: it would minimize the importance
of the choices a person S makes during S’s pre-heavenly existence, at least
where those choices have an effect on the degree to which S is happy in heaven.
To see why, say Samantha and Sarah die in a state of grace and so both
go to heaven. Although Samantha dies possessing the habit of charity,
Sarah’s charity at the time of her death far outstrips that possessed by
Samantha. Both Samantha and Sarah will be perfectly happy in heaven,
since both get to eternally contemplate and delight in God. But according
I explain the meaning of essential beatitude later in this section.
“Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 418. See the long passage quoted in
section 1 of this paper.
22
It may be that Pawl and Timpe accept (iii) and (iv), but do not see (iii) and (iv) as essential to their solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom (see their “Heavenly Freedom:
A Reply To Cowan,” 196–197). In that case, given that the redeemed in heaven’s having the
ability to make morally relevant choices is essential to Pawl and Timpe’s solution, my arguments that follow can be taken as an admonition that Pawl and Timpe should not, in fact,
accept both (iii) and (iv).
20
21
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to one theological tradition, Sarah’s happiness in heaven will be greater
than Samantha’s, since Sarah died with a greater love for God—and so
God rewards Sarah with a greater degree of beatitude.23 According to
Pawl and Timpe, human persons in heaven (apparently) exist for an
infinite duration of time, where at any or all points on such a heavenly
timeline Samantha or Sarah may or may not make a series of morally
relevant choices. Theoretically, Samantha might eventually outpace Sarah
in choosing to perform more supererogatory acts in heaven. That would
seem to suggest that, given enough time, the choices Samantha and Sarah
made in this life would eventually become irrelevant in heaven where the
degree of their beatitude, i.e., “their closeness to God” is concerned. Say,
for example, that Sarah shows great love for God and neighbor in this
life by following the example of Blessed Mother Theresa and becomes a
Sister of Charity, and Sarah dies with a great deal of charity in her soul.
Samantha dies with love of God in her soul, but has in this life habitually
resisted giving herself wholly to God. In fact, she often acted with the
thought in mind, “I’ll have plenty of time in eternity to grow closer to
23
See, e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia. q. 12, a. 6 and ST IaIIae. q. 5, a. 2. St. Thomas thinks
that, in one sense, all human persons in heaven enjoy the same reward, i.e., directly knowing
and loving God Himself. But each of the saints in heaven enjoys God to the extent or degree
to which she possesses charity for God at the end of her earthly existence. Why think the
latter? No creature can enjoy the beatific vision without receiving a special supernatural
grace from God that St. Thomas calls the light of glory. The light of glory is God’s gift of grace
to the saints in heaven whereby they “see” God’s essence. But the amount of light the saints
receive is relative to their desire to see God. The more a saint longs to see God, the greater the
light of glory in her soul and so the greater her participation in the beatific vision of God in
heaven. But the degree to which a saint longs to see God in heaven is relative to the amount
of charity for God that the saint has in her soul when she dies. Therefore, the degree to which
a saint in heaven enjoys God in heaven is relative to the amount of charity the saint has at
the end of her earthly life. Since some of the redeemed in heaven die with greater charity for
God than others, some saints are happier than others in heaven.
For the doctrine that different human persons merit different degrees of beatitude in
heaven in early Church sources, see, e.g., Aphraates the Persian Sage, Treatises xxii, 19; St.
Jerome, Against Jovian ii, 32; St. Augustine of Hippo, Sermons lxxxvii, 6; St. Augustine, Homilies
on John lxvii, 2; St. Augustine, Enchiridion xxix, 111; St. Gregory the Great, Moralia iv, 36, 70.
For an authoritative statement from the Catholic Church on there being different degrees of
beatitude in heaven, see, e.g., Decree for the Greeks, the General Council of Florence, session
six (6 July 1439): “Also, the souls of those who have incurred no stain of sin whatsoever after
baptism, as well as those souls who after incurring the stain of sin have been cleansed whether
in their bodies or outside their bodies, as was stated above, are straightaway (mox) received
into heaven and clearly behold the triune God as he is, yet one person more perfectly than another
according to the difference of their merits” (Tanner, ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 527–528;
emphasis mine). For a compelling artistic expression of the doctrine, see Dante’s Paradiso.
An anonymous reviewer worries that talk of “meriting greater or lesser rewards in heaven”
smacks of Pelagianism and suggests there are counter-currents to such talk in St. Augustine
and St. Thomas. I suspect the problem here is merely terminological. At any rate, as the
Council of Trent makes clear, whatever good works the saints do as the outworking of their
faith, thereby meriting greater glory (and so happiness) in heaven, they do those good works
by the grace of God. See, e.g., The Decree on Justification, ch. 16, nn. 1545–1548 as well as canon
32. Consider also the following passage from St. Augustine: “ ‘Who crowns you with mercy and
loving-kindness.’ You had perhaps begun to be in a manner proud, when you heard the words,
‘He crowns you.’ I am then great, I have then wrestled. By whose strength? By yours, but supplied by Him. . . . He crowns you, because He is crowning His own gifts, not your deservings”
(Exposition of the Psalms 103, 6; accessed at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1801103.htm).
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God.” If it is possible for Samantha to outpace Sarah in her love for God
in heaven insofar as she makes better morally relevant choices in heaven
and so comes to enjoy a greater union with God in heaven than Sarah, that
would seem to seriously downplay the importance of what Samantha and
Sarah choose to do for God in this life. But according to the theological
tradition I’ve invoked here, the choices human persons make in this life
are vitally important, not only for whether such persons get to heaven,
but also for determining how well-placed such persons will be in eternity.
A second reason for thinking that the redeemed in heaven cannot get
ever closer to God in heaven is that this view is incompatible with one important traditional Christian account of the relation between one’s moral
character and beatitude. The traditional picture I’m thinking about is the
Catholic Christian view as articulated by some eminent twentieth-century
Catholic theologians as well as St. Thomas Aquinas.
As theologian Ludwig Ott notes, it is a dogma of the Catholic Church
that “the degree of perfection of the beatific vision granted to the just is
proportioned to each one’s merits.”24 Therefore, the orthodox Catholic
should accept the following:
(vi) If the redeemed in heaven have the ability to get ever closer to God
in heaven, i.e., advance in the beatific vision or essential beatitude,
then the redeemed in heaven have the ability to undergo moral
improvement in heaven, i.e., they can merit in heaven.
But eminent twentieth-century Catholic theologians reject the consequent
of (vi). To see why, consider first a passage from Scripture, John 9:4: “I
must work the works of him that sent me, whilst it is day; the night cometh, when no man can work.”25 Ludwig Ott suggests that in this passage
“the period of earthly life is the ‘Day,’ the time for work, the period after
death is the ‘Night, when no man can work.’”26 The person meriting therefore “must be . . . here on earth.”27 The notion that the saints in heaven
can perform actions that allow them to advance in beatitude, i.e., get ever
closer to God, is incompatible with Catholic eschatology, at least as it is
explained by some orthodox twentieth-century Catholic theologians.
24
Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, trans. Patrick Lynch (Rockford, IL: Tan Publishers,
1974), 479. Ott cites decrees from the Council of Florence and the Council of Trent. As for the
decree from the Council of Florence, see the passage from session six (6 July 1439) cited in
note 23 above. As for the decree from the Council of Trent, see session six (13 January 1547),
Decree on Justification, canon 32.
25
See also the passages of Scripture cited in note 14 above.
26
Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 474.
27
Ibid., 266. For another articulation of this view, see Karl Adam’s The Spirit of Catholicism: “death is the end of all creative moral initiative and meritorious activity” (Dom Justin
McCann, trans. [Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1954]), 110). See also the following
passage from Anscar Vonier’s essay on death and judgment in The Teaching of the Catholic
Church: “Through death there comes a sudden and permanent standstill to that mighty forward movement of man’s soul which has been produced by the grace of God. The period of
spiritual change, of merit, of progress, is forever at an end” (George D. Smith, ed. [New York:
MacMillan, 1949], vol. 2, 1107).
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In addition, it is clear St. Thomas rejects the notion that a saint in heaven
can advance in beatitude, i.e., make spiritual or moral progress in heaven:
Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. . . . [E]very rational
creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude, that from God’s predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently,
when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.28

As the quotation above shows, St. Thomas rejects the view that the saints
in heaven can advance in (essential) beatitude. But the passage above also
shows why he thinks so. For St. Thomas also accepts (vi),29 and so, given that
“merit and progress belong to this present condition of life,” it follows that
the antecedent of (vi) is false. Therefore, according to the views of St. Thomas
and some eminent twentieth-century Catholic theologians, the redeemed in
heaven do not have the ability to get ever closer to God in heaven.
A third reason for thinking the redeemed in heaven can’t get ever closer
to God in heaven can be generated from St. Thomas’s views on the nature of
eternal life itself.30 According to St. Thomas, we should distinguish between
the essence of perfect happiness in heaven, or essential beatitude, and that
which is accidental to perfect happiness in heaven, or accidental beatitude.31
28
ST Ia. q. 62, a. 9, sed contra and respondeo (Fathers of the English Dominican Providence,
trans. [Allen, TX: Christian Classics, 1950, vol. 1]). All citations from St. Thomas’s ST in this
paper are taken from this translation. See also: ST Suppl. q. 71, a. 5, respondeo; ST Suppl. q.
71, a. 8, ad3, and De Malo q. 5, a. 4, ad5. See also the constant theme in St. Thomas’s work
that in this life human persons are wayfarers, whereas the saints in heaven have arrived at
their proper place. For example, the following passage from Compendium theologiae (CT),
chs. 149–150 is representative of the theme (and St. Thomas’s understanding) of heaven as
arrival: “The Beatific Vision entails immutability in the . . . will. . . . The will is subject to
change because it craves what it does not possess. Clearly, therefore, the final consummation
of man consists in perfect repose or unchangeableness as regards . . . [the] will. . . . [I]n his
final consummation man attains eternal life, not only in the sense that he lives an immortal
life in his soul—for this is a property of the rational soul in its very nature, as was shown
above—but also in the sense that he is brought to the perfection of immobility” (Cyril Vollert,
trans. [Manchester, NH: Sophia Institute Press, 1993], 168).
29
See, e.g., ST Ia. q. 12, a. 6, and ST IaIIae q. 5, a. 2. See also note 23 above.
30
I treat St. Thomas’s views on eternal life, time, and heaven in greater detail in an unpublished paper entitled, “St. Thomas on Time, Eternal life, and the Beatific Vision.”
31
St. Thomas finds precedent for distinguishing essential from accidental beatitude in Aristotle’s distinction in Nicomachean Ethics between the essence of happiness, on the one hand, and
the embellishment or well-being of happiness on the other (see, e.g., St. Thomas’s Commentary on
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (In NE) I, lec. 13, n. 163; In NE I, lec. 14, n. 173; In NE I, lec.
16, n. 194, and In NE X, lec. 11, n. 2104). Applying this distinction to beatitude in heaven, St.
Thomas distinguishes between the essence of perfect happiness in heaven (essential beatitude)
and the well-being (bene esse) of perfect happiness (essential beatitude plus accidental beatitude).
St. Thomas uses the distinction between the essence of perfect happiness and the well-being
of perfect happiness throughout his scholarly life. In addition to the texts from In NE, see,
e.g.: ST Suppl. q. 96, a. 1, ad1; ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 5; ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 6, respondeo; ST IaIIae. q. 4,
a. 6, ad1; ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 7, ad3; ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 8, respondeo, and ST IaIIae. q. 5, a. 2, ad3. In
distinguishing essential beatitude from accidental beatitude, St. Thomas sometimes speaks
instead of the essential heavenly reward in contrast to the accidental reward. Like the distinction between the essence of perfect happiness and the well-being of perfect happiness, St.
Thomas employs the distinction between the essential heavenly reward and the accidental
reward throughout his career. See, e.g.: ST Suppl. q. 10, a. 2, ad2; ST Suppl. q. 13, a. 2, ad1; ST
Suppl. q. 25, a. 2, ad2; ST Suppl. q. 27, a. 3, ad1; ST Suppl. q. 41, a. 4, ad1; ST Suppl. q. 71, a. 1,
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St. Thomas argues that the essence of perfect happiness in heaven consists in the beatific vision alone, i.e., a saint’s unmediated intellectual and
volitional union with God in heaven,32 whereas any other dimension to
human happiness in heaven, e.g., embodiment at the general resurrection
or cognition of other creatures in heaven, is merely accidental to perfect
happiness in heaven.33
In St. Thomas’s view, the essence of perfect happiness in heaven consists in beatific union with God alone since such a union—and only such a
union—satisfies every desire of the human heart. Nonetheless, the goods
of embodiment and friendship are fitting goods for human beings, who,
after-all, are social animals, thinks St. Thomas. But such goods necessarily
pale by comparison to the good of knowing the essence of the infinitely
perfect God. Therefore, the goods of embodiment and human friendship,
in relation to perfect human happiness, are aptly spoken of as accidental
in the strict sense that, although these goods are compatible with perfect
human happiness in heaven, perfect human happiness in heaven can
exist without them. In addition, essential beatitude is independent of accidental beatitude for St. Thomas in the sense that accidental beatitude
does not increase the intensity of the saint’s perfect happiness in heaven.34
At best, the addition of accidental beatitude to essential beatitude increases
the scope of perfect happiness in heaven, e.g., it flows from a saint’s soul
into her body,35 or it is a fitting adornment for essential beatitude.36
St. Thomas does think accidental beatitude (a) can increase until the
day of judgment,37 for example, as more human persons join the Church
triumphant,38 and (b) involves a saint’s undergoing changes, for example,
moving her body from one place to another in the next life.39 But in St.
respondeo; ST Suppl. q. 71, a. 5, respondeo; ST Suppl. q. 71, a. 8, ad3; ST Suppl. q. 89, a. 2, ad5;
ST Suppl. q. 89, a. 3, ad3; ST Suppl. q. 92, a. 3, respondeo; ST Suppl. q. 93, a. 3, ad3; ST Suppl. q.
96, a. 1; ST Suppl. q. 96, a. 2, ad3; ST Suppl. q. 98, a. 6, respondeo; ST Suppl. Appendix I, q. 2, a.
4, ad4; ST Ia. q. 62, a. 9, ad3; ST Ia. q. 95, a. 4, respondeo; ST IIaIIae. q. 152, a. 4, ad1; ST IIaIIae.
q. 182, a. 2, ad1, and ST IIIa. q. 89, a. 5, ad3.
32
See, e.g.: ST Suppl. q. 79, a. 1, respondeo; ST Ia. q. 12, a. 1, respondeo; ST IaIIae. q. 3, a. 8,
respondeo; ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 1, obj. 2; ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 5, respondeo, and ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 8,
respondeo; ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 8, ad1, and ST IaIIae. q. 69, a. 3, respondeo.
33
See, e.g.: ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 5 and ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 8.
34
See, e.g., ST IaIIae. q. 5, a. 2, ad3: “None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since
they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is ‘the good of all good,’ as Augustine says (Enarr. in
Ps. 134). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the
same good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine
says (Confess. v, 4): ‘He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the happier for knowing
them, but is happy for knowing Thee alone’.”
35
See, e.g., ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 5, ad2 and ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 5, ad5.
36
See, e.g., ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 6, ad1 and ST IaIIae. q. 4, a. 7, ad3.
37
See, e.g.: ST Suppl. q. 92, a. 3, respondeo; ST Suppl. q. 98, a. 6, respondeo; ST Ia. q. 62, a. 9,
ad3, and ST IIaIIae. q. 182, a. 2.
38
See, e.g., ST Suppl. q. 71, a. 8, ad3.
39
St. Thomas thinks that the glorified bodies do move and change. For one thing, Christ—
who is the forerunner of the saints in all things—moved his glorified body. Also, St. Thomas
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Thomas’s view essential beatitude itself is invariable,40 even immutable
and timeless.41 Why does St. Thomas think that the essential beatitude of
the saints is immutable and timeless? The Gospels often speak of heaven as
“eternal life.”42 According to St. Thomas, this is because the beatific vision
is a participation in God’s own eternal life.43 St. Thomas is fond of citing
1 John 3:2 in this context: “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him
because we shall see Him as He is.”44 We shall be like to Him. As is well
known, St. Thomas thinks that God’s nature is timeless and absolutely
immutable.45 Therefore, given St. Thomas’s view that a saint’s closeness
to God in heaven is a function of the extent to which she participates
accepts the Church’s tradition that the glorified bodies of the saints have four special properties, or gifts: clarity, impassibility, subtlety, and agility (see, e.g., ST Suppl. qq. 82–85 and
Commentary on St. Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians, ch.15, nn. 980–988).
40
See, e.g., ST Suppl. q. 71, a. 5; ST Suppl. q. 71, a. 8, ad3, and ST Suppl. q. 98, a. 6, respondeo.
41
See, e.g., Commentary on Lombard’s Sentences (In Sent.) IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 3, ad4: “To
the fourth, it should be said that the eternal life the saints will have is spoken of according to
a participation of eternity, not merely with regard to lacking an end (in which manner even
the punishment of the damned is called ‘eternal’). But further with regard to the removal of
all change, not only in act, which an ‘age’ too excludes, but even in potency. For the saints,
through clinging to God, will obtain such stability from the divine gift that they cannot
be changed—a stability God has by his nature, by reason of which he is eternal” (Peter A.
Kwasniewski, Thomas Bolin, and Joseph Bolin, trans., On Love and Charity: Readings from the
‘Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard’ [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2008], 361). See also: In Sent. IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 3, c.; In Sent. IV, d. 49, q.
1, a. 2, qla. 3, ad 3; Summa contra gentiles III, chs. 60–62; CT, chs. 149–150 (see note 28 above
where I sight a text from this passage); Commentary on the Gospel according to St. John (In
John), ch. 17, lec. 1, n. 2186; ST IaIIae q. 5, a. 4; ST IaIIae. q. 67, a. 4, ad2, and ST IaIIae. q. 67,
a. 5, ad3. In particular, see ST IaIIae. q. 67, a. 4, ad2: “in the lost there will be a succession of
punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of
fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation in eternity, wherein there is neither past nor future, but only the present.”
A reader might object: (a) by speaking of the beatific vision as “timeless” Aquinas could
mean to ascribe aeviternity, i.e., the natural mode of existence of the angels, to the beatific vision of the saints in heaven, since, strictly speaking, aeviternity and time constitute different
modes of existence for St. Thomas. The problem with (a) is that St. Thomas explicitly states
that the mode of existence of the beatific vision itself, i.e., “the vision of glory,” is not the
same as the mode of existence that St. Thomas calls aeviternity, but surpasses it. See, e.g., ST
Ia. q. 10, a. 3, respondeo; ST Ia. q. 10 a. 5, ad1, and Catena aurea, Luke 20, lec. 4.
Finally, it should be noted that in holding the view that the beatific vision is a timeless
and immutable cognition of God, St. Thomas is following a theological tradition that goes
back at least as far as St. Augustine. For example, in Summa contra gentiles (SCG), book III,
ch. 60, St. Thomas cites a passage from St. Augustine’s De trinitate, book xv: “Our thoughts
[in heaven] will not then be fleeting, going to and fro from some things to others, but we
shall see all our knowledge in one single glance” (Vernon J. Bourke, trans. (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1950), 200. See also ST Ia. q. 10, a. 3, respondeo.
42
See, e.g.: Mt 19:29; Mt 25:46; Mk 10:30; Lk 18:30; Jn 3:15; Jn 3:16; Jn 3:36; Jn 4:14; Jn 4:36;
Jn 5:24; Jn 5:39; Jn 6:40; Jn 6:47; Jn 6:54; Jn 6:68; Jn 10:28; Jn 12:25, and Jn 17:2–3.
43
See, e.g., ST IaIIae. q. 3, a. 1, ad1.
44
See, e.g., ST Ia. q. 12, a. 1, sed contra and ST IaIIae. q. 3, a. 8, sed contra. John 17:3b (“Now
this is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou
hast sent.”) is another favorite Johannian passage of St. Thomas’s where thinking about eternal
life as a participation in God’s timelessly eternal life is concerned (see, e.g.: ST Ia. q. 10, a. 3,
respondeo; CT, ch. 163; In John 17, lec. 1, n. 2186, and Commentary on Liber de Causis, lec. 2).
45
See, e.g., ST Ia. qq. 9 and 10.
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in God in the beatific vision, i.e., she enjoys essential beatitude, and the
essential beatitude of a saint in heaven is invariable, immutable, and timeless, it therefore follows that the saints in heaven can’t get ever closer to
God in heaven.46
We are now in a position to bring this second objection to Pawl and
Timpe’s solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom to a close. I’ve adduced three reasons for thinking the redeemed in heaven can’t get ever
closer to God in heaven. By modus tollens, Pawl and Timpe are therefore
either wrong to think that human persons in heaven make morally relevant choices—see proposition (v)—or else they need to reject proposition
(iii) or proposition (iv).
Here follows a third objection to Pawl and Timpe’s solution to the
Problem of Heavenly Freedom. One of the objections to which Pawl and
Timpe respond in defending their proposed solution to the Problem of
Heavenly Freedom is the following: given the account of freedom in
heaven that Pawl and Timpe propose, it is not possible that non-derivative
acts of freewill in heaven have moral significance. But if acts of free choice
lack moral significance, they lack moral weight. But, acts of freewill have
moral weight in heaven of all places. Therefore, there is something wrong
with Pawl and Timpe’s proposed solution to the Problem of Heavenly
Freedom. Call this the Objection from Moral Weight.
Pawl and Timpe respond to the Objection from Moral Weight by
granting that persons in heaven do not have non-derivative morally significant freedom, but they maintain the redeemed in heaven can nonetheless
46
Note that the distinction between essential and accidental beatitude allows St. Thomas a
way of responding to the objection that human happiness in heaven can’t be immutable and
timeless in the sense of being non-successive, since the happiness of the saints (eventually)
involves embodiment, and bodies move, which implies that human happiness in heaven involves successiveness (In fact, St. Thomas thinks that the saints will also cognize some things
successively as a part of the accidental reward, e.g., the planets, the bodies of other saints,
etc. [see, e.g., ST Suppl. q. 92, a. 2, respondeo and ad6; see also SCG IV, ch. 86]). It is true, St.
Thomas would respond, that accidental beatitude involves successiveness. But that does not
prevent essential beatitude being such that it does not involve successiveness. Even though
the saints themselves undergo changes in heaven insofar as their bodies move and they
have intermittent sense experiences—indeed, the saints go from a state of not experiencing
the beatific vision, before they exist in heaven, to a state of experiencing it in heaven—their
enjoyment of God in the beatific vision itself is experienced timelessly and immutably. St. Thomas
thinks that human experience in heaven is thus analogous to (a) the experience of Christ in
his human nature, who—both before and after the resurrection—enjoys multiple forms of
cognition, i.e., acquired, infused, and beatific knowledge (see, e.g., ST IIIa. q. 9) and (b) the
blessed angels, who possess a natural mode of cognition in addition to the beatific vision
(see, e.g., ST Ia. q. 58, a. 1 and a. 2; ST Ia. q. 62, a. 7). Indeed, in enjoying multiple modes of
cognition in heaven, the saints “are as the angels in heaven” (Matthew 22:30b). See also ST
Ia. q. 10, a. 5, ad1: “Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are
measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23) that to be moved
through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by
aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.” For further
defense of the coherence of St. Thomas’s distinction between an essential reward in heaven
and an accidental reward, see my “Friendship in Heaven: Aquinas on Supremely Perfect
Happiness and the Communion of the Saints,” in Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of
Eleonore Stump, ed. Kevin Timpe (New York: Routledge, 2009), 225–248.
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make some morally relevant choices, e.g., choices whether or not to perform supererogatory acts, and such choices have moral weight.47 But, as
I’ve argued above, if propositions (iii) and (iv) are true, and there are good
reasons to think the redeemed in heaven can’t grow ever closer to God in
heaven, then we have good reason to think the redeemed in heaven do
not have the ability to make morally relevant choices. Given such assumptions, Pawl and Timpe’s solution to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is
still vulnerable to the Objection from Moral Weight.
3. Expanding the Class of Morally Weighty Actions
In my view, Pawl and Timpe’s basic approach to the Problem of Heavenly
Freedom is worth preserving. For ideally, the redeemed in heaven do have
a history of making free choices in this life, which choices have contributed to the development of the perfected moral characters the redeemed
possess in heaven. But one of the consequences of original sin is that not
all human persons in heaven, namely, those who died (and were baptized)
before reaching the age of reason, have had the opportunity to choose
between good and evil. Presumably those human persons who have never
had the chance to make morally significant choices nonetheless have the
ability to act freely in heaven, even freely in a robust manner, since they are
not only persons but perfected persons. But how can such persons perform
even derivatively free actions? In addition, what if propositions (iii) and (iv)
are true and none of the redeemed in heaven have the ability to advance
in their beatitude? In that case, none of the saints in heaven, for all we’ve
seen, have the ability to make non-derivative, morally weighty choices. We
therefore need a modified explanation for why the redeemed in heaven do
in fact engage in free actions that have moral weight. My strategy: just
as Pawl and Timpe expand the class of morally weighty choices beyond
morally significant choices to include choices to perform supererogatory
acts, I argue we should expand the class of morally weighty actions even
further to include choices I shall call morally grave.
Suppose Jane has a morally virtuous character such that she will give
some of her expendable income away to those who are in need. Now suppose also that, because of where Jane lives (and the manner in which she
virtuously lives her life), Jane’s options are limited as to just who will receive Jane’s gift: she could give it to the poor, or she could give it to the sick,
or she could give a certain percentage to the sick and a certain percentage
to the poor. Now, are any of these options really better than any of the
others? Suppose that Jane—who has the virtue of prudence—reasons that
the answer is “no” and Jane—who also feels a particularly strong calling
to help the sick—chooses to give her money to the sick. Now according
to the definition of a morally relevant choice offered by Pawl and Timpe,
this choice is not morally relevant, since of the many options open to her
in this situation, no one of them is objectively better than any of the others.
47

“Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” 416–417.
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But surely Jane’s choice to help the poor nonetheless has moral weight. We
might think the reason Jane’s free act of helping the sick (rather than the
poor) is a morally weighty choice is that such a choice demonstrates moral
excellence on Jane’s part.
To see another example of a choice which is not morally relevant in
Pawl and Timpe’s sense but nonetheless has moral weight, consider one
of Pawl and Timpe’s own examples:
[S]ay that Satan freely becomes so vicious that he can no longer perform
morally praiseworthy actions. As an out-flowing of his vicious character, he
wants to punish Teresa for her virtuous behavior. And given his devilish nature, he cannot choose an option that is morally good. But should he avenge
her virtue by defiling her children with painful boils, send his demons to
tear her limb from limb, or simply torture her to death himself?48

Now, suppose Satan is confined (for example, by the power of God) in
a given circumstance to making one of the choices that Pawl and Timpe
mention here. Given his moral character, Satan will choose to perform one
of these actions. All of these actions are morally vicious actions. It also
seems plausible to suppose that all of these actions are equally vicious.49
In that case, Satan’s choice, for example, to torture Teresa himself, is not a
morally relevant choice. But surely it is a choice that carries moral weight,
since it is a morally vicious choice.
Why do morally virtuous or vicious choices necessarily count as
having moral weight? We might think that it is simply self-evident that
such actions are morally weighty. On the other hand, perhaps we could
say that virtuous and vicious choices have moral weight whenever they
are free choices that constitute, cause, or express the moral character of the
persons who perform them. Call such free choices morally grave choices.
For example, John freely commits a murder. Such a free action has moral
gravity—and so moral weight—simply because it is (let’s suppose) a
cause of John’s morally vicious moral character. On the other hand, Jane
is morally virtuous; in particular she is merciful. Her free act of mercy
towards someone who has wronged her has moral gravity—and so moral
weight—simply because it is an expression of her virtuous moral character. I
therefore propose the following sufficient conditions for a morally weighty
free choice:
(MW) A free choice is morally weighty if (a) it is a morally relevant
choice or (b) it is a morally grave choice, i.e., a person S’s morally
excellent or morally vicious choice that constitutes, is a cause of,
or is an expression of S’s moral character.50
Ibid., 416.
In correspondence Kevin Timpe says he is tempted to say that one of these options may
be worse than the others, but admits that there are possible cases where the various options
open to a free agent are all equally vicious.
50
Note that all morally significant choices are morally relevant choices.
48
49
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Some of the choices of the redeemed in heaven are morally grave, and
so morally weighty. Why think so? To begin with, in the case of some (but
not all) of the saints in heaven, we can construe even the beatific vision as
a derivatively free and morally grave choice insofar as a saint’s engaging
in the beatific vision can be traced back to free choices she made during
this life. Although we might think that St. Paul can no longer choose not
to experience the beatific vision once he comes to experience it,51 his experiencing it in the manner that he does52 has as a necessary condition
his making some morally relevant choices in this life. Since St. Paul’s act
of seeing God in heaven is constitutive of his being perfectly happy,53 St.
Paul’s act of seeing God is a morally grave and so a morally weighty choice,
at least derivatively, insofar as St. Paul’s act of seeing God is (partially)
caused by the morally significant choices that St. Paul made in this life.
Nonetheless, as we saw above, there are reasons to think that some
of the saints in heaven have never made morally significant choices, i.e.,
human persons who died (and were baptized) before reaching the age of
reason. For them, the beatific vision cannot be construed as an act of free
choice, even derivatively. But we can note ways in which all human persons in heaven make morally grave free choices by drawing on some of the
views of St. Thomas Aquinas. Recall first St. Thomas’s distinction between
essential beatitude, which includes the beatific vision, and accidental
beatitude, e.g., a saint’s moving her glorified body in heaven. Second,
given St. Thomas’s views on heaven, the following proposition is true:
(vii) In his human nature, Christ possesses multiple forms of cognition,
e.g., he has acquired, infused, and beatific knowledge; the blessed
angels too possess a natural mode of cognition in addition to the
beatific vision.54
By analogy with Christ and the blessed angels, we can think with St.
Thomas that
(viii) The saints in heaven, after the general resurrection, enjoy multiple
modes of cognition, e.g., there is the timeless and immutable act
which is the beatific vision, but, as a part of the accidental beatitude of the saints, there are also those acts of cognition analogous
to acts of cognition in which many of the redeemed were engaged
in this life, e.g., a saint’s seeing with her glorified body the body of
Christ and a saint’s willing her body to travel to Mars.55
I say why this might be the case later in the paper.
The caveat is important for, as I’ve argued, not all the saints have acting freely in this life
as a necessary condition for having the beatific vision, e.g., those who die in a state of grace
before attaining the age of reason. Nonetheless, St. Paul’s experiencing the beatific vision
to the degree or in the manner that he does is contingent upon his having made certain free
choices in this life. See what follows and note 23 above for more discussion of this point.
53
See, e.g., ST IaIIae. q. 3, a. 8.
54
See the texts cited in note 46 above.
55
See the texts cited in notes 39 and 46 above.
51
52
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If (vii) and (viii) are true, we are here beholding some deep mysteries.
But let us simply assume, for the sake of argument, that (vii) and (viii) are
indeed true. That means that, although the saint’s beatific vision itself is
something timeless and immutable, and therefore not subject to succession, the saint in heaven is also engaged in cognitive acts that do involve
succession. Such successive cognitive acts are a function of non-derivative
free choices made by the saints in heaven. But whatever the redeemed
in heaven choose to do in heaven they choose as an expression of their
morally perfected characters. Such morally excellent choices on the part
of the redeemed in heaven are morally grave ones, and so are also morally
weighty. Therefore, given this Thomistic account of the blessedness of the
saints, all human persons in heaven make non-derivative morally weighty
choices, even if none of them make non-derivative morally significant or
morally relevant choices, since all human persons in heaven make morally
grave choices.
4. The Problem of Heavenly Freedom and the Free Will Defense
We might wonder whether my modified version of Pawl and Timpe’s
response to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom is consistent with advocating the free will defense. For, if some persons can be perfectly happy
and act freely in heaven without ever possessing the freedom to choose
for or against God, how can we say that the exercise of libertarian free
will in making morally significant choices is a good of such value that
it outweighs all the evil in the world? Why didn’t God simply create all
persons in heaven?
If by supposition there are some human persons in heaven who act
freely there but never had a chance to freely contribute to the development
of their own moral characters, then it seems reasonable to think that those
human persons have a relationship with God that differs in a significant
way from the relationship with God possessed by those who did have a
chance to make morally significant choices, namely, the latter will be happier
than the former in heaven. As we’ve seen, according to the Catholic Christian
theological tradition, some human persons are happier in heaven than
others. But if Jane is happier than John in heaven, then it is because Jane’s
love for God at the time of her death is greater than John’s love for God at
the time of his death. Although seeing God face to face is what makes each
and every non-divine person perfectly happy, Jane nonetheless sees God
more clearly than John—which God arranges in accord with the different
degrees of desire to see God on the part of Jane and John—and so Jane’s
eternal bliss is greater than John’s. But now consider the following case.
Maria is baptized, but dies before she can ever exercise her own power
to make morally significant choices. According to St. Thomas56 (and the
teaching magisterium of the Catholic Church57), when Maria is baptized,
56
57

See, e.g., ST IIIa. q. 69, a. 6.
See, e.g., CCC 1266.
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God infuses in her the theological virtues, virtues which include the virtue
of charity. Although Maria obviously cannot make an act of charity before
the age of reason, she does nonetheless count as someone who possesses
charity as a habit at the time of her death, the possession of which is sufficient for her salvation. But someone who has the habit of charity without
any act of charity has less charity than a person who has the habit of charity
and by God’s grace has also acted with charity. Just as Jane is happier than
John in heaven, so John is happier than Maria in heaven, since Maria died
merely with the habit of charity while John died possessing not only the
habit of charity but as someone who has acted with charity as well.
What’s the significance of all of this for the free will defense? Although
God can create human persons such that they exist in heaven even though
they never make morally significant choices, these persons are not as
happy as those persons who go to heaven, having made morally significant choices at some point during their pre-heavenly existence. Consider
one way of making sense of what I’ve said here: unlike other loving relationships, e.g., the father/son relationship, the friendship relation requires
that each party in the relation freely choose to enter into the relationship.
Therefore, we might think that a human person’s enjoying fellowship with
God in heaven that exists according to the order of friendship requires that
that human person by grace freely chooses to unite herself to God in this
life. Furthermore, let us suppose that a baptized person who dies before
ever exercising the power of free choice can enjoy the divine vision. As
such, such a person is perfectly happy, which entails, among other things,
that all of her desires are sated. But her happiness is not as great as the
saint who freely entered into fellowship with God in this life. Friendship
with God in heaven, which requires someone’s making significant free
choices in this life, is thus a great good. Therefore, the free will defender
can argue that (it is possible that) some non-divine persons making significant moral choices to will in this life in accord with what God wills
such that they come to enjoy friendship with God in heaven is a good of
such value that it outweighs all the evil in the world.
5. Pawl and Timpe’s Solution: One Final Improvement
Consider only those among the redeemed in heaven who did have the
opportunity to play a role in forming their own moral characters in this
life. Recall that Pawl and Timpe explain that such persons are unable to
will evil in heaven on account of their morally perfected characters. But we
might think that the moral impeccability of such persons in heaven is not
simply a consequence of the moral character to which these persons freely
contributed during their pre-heavenly existence, but is also a consequence
of what it means to be in heaven. Here again I’m taking a lead from St.
Thomas. St. Thomas thinks that when the saints come to enjoy the divine
vision, they will necessarily love what they see.58 Furthermore, a person
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who “sees” God’s essence simply cannot “turn away” from God’s essence
to will something that is not in accord with the will of God, since, given
that every human desire is satisfied in such a vision, there could be no
possible motive for such a turning away from God.59
St. Thomas’s account of heaven helps the case for traditional Christian
theism, for some think it impossible or unlikely for human beings to
develop a morally perfect character that entails moral impeccability. For
example, Graham Oppy, Yujin Nagasawa, and Nick Trakakis have argued
that, “given what we know about human nature, even given the absence
of temptation and the presence of divinity, it still seems extraordinarily
unlikely that free human agents will survive an eternity without ever
straying from the path of righteousness.”60 In responding to an objection
of this sort, Pawl and Timpe mention the importance of the reality of purgatory for developing moral impeccability in the saints in heaven.61 This
response is certainly helpful. But St. Thomas’s account of essential beatitude provides an even stronger response to the sort of objection raised by
Oppy et al.: committing an evil act in heaven is psychologically impossible,
given the perfect good which the redeemed possess in the beatific vision.
The act of seeing the essence of God can nonetheless be a derivatively
free act (in the libertarian sense) because, ideally, the act which consists
in the beatific vision can trace back to the pre-heavenly existence of the
redeemed person, a state in which the redeemed person had a role to play
by way of cooperating with God in the development of her own virtuous
moral character.
6. Conclusion
In taking a critical look at Pawl and Timpe’s solution to the Problem of
Heavenly Freedom, I’ve emphasized what the Catholic and Thomistic
traditions have to say about heaven. For those inclined to accept these
Catholic and/or Thomistic traditions on heaven, I’ve offered a solution
to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom that has the advantage of being
more consistent with such traditions than the solution offered by Pawl
and Timpe. In addition, my solution is not missing any of the virtues of
Pawl and Timpe’s solution. Given my own commitments to the reality of
libertarian free will and the truth of the Catholic and Thomistic traditions
on heaven, I have thus sought to make Pawl and Timpe’s “best” solution
to the Problem of Heavenly Freedom even better.62
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